PLA Principles—People’s War

Chinese Tactics > PART ONE: People’s Liberation Army Forces > Chapter 1: People’s Liberation Army Fundamentals > PLA Principles—People’s War

1-43. PLA principles were originally written by Mao Zedong during the Long March of 1934—35 and revised during the Japanese occupation of China, beginning in 1937. These principles still serve as the basis for People’s War theories, though they have been modernized periodically along with the rest of Chinese military thought. There are numerous different interpretations and translations of these principles, varying widely based on when and where they were written and translated. However, the versions are all similar, generally reflecting Communist political sensibilities, a focus on mobility and deception, and a strong understanding of basic military theory. The key themes of People’s War are—

• Eliminate isolated pockets of the enemy before concentrating to fight larger forces.
• Capture small villages and towns before capturing large urban areas. 
• Eliminate the enemy’s fighting capacity; do not focus on territory.
• Fight no battle unprepared; develop strategy based on the worst conditions.
• Concentrate forces to achieve an overwhelming advantage in numbers, then defeat the enemy in detail.
• Choose the first battle carefully.
• Unify the command and coordinate.
• Combine mobile war, positional war, and guerrilla war.
• Employ forces and tactics flexibly.
• Fight in one’s own way, and let the enemy fight in its.

ELIMINATE ISOLATED POCKETS OF THE ENEMY BEFORE CONCENTRATING TO FIGHT LARGER FORCES 

1-44. This principle is similar to Western maneuver warfare theories developed during the World Wars. It calls for rapid maneuver and decisive attacks against weak points before finally seeking a decisive engagement against an unbalanced enemy. 

CAPTURE SMALL VILLAGES AND TOWNS BEFORE CAPTURING LARGE URBAN AREAS 

1-45. This somewhat unique Communist Chinese principle was formed from the success of early PLA operations against Japanese and Republican Chinese forces. Operating in rural areas made it difficult for early PLA opponents to detect and fix PLA formations. In expeditionary warfare, this principle likely implies targeting less-challenging defensive positions first, then moving on to more well-defended and critical positions once initial gains are consolidated. 

ELIMINATE THE ENEMY’S FIGHTING CAPACITY; DO NOT FOCUS ON TERRITORY 

1-46. This principle is similar to the principle in paragraph 1-45 about towns and cities. It recognizes that, for most military campaigns, the center of gravity is the enemy force, not territory. Chinese forces may temporarily—or even deliberately—cede territory in order to enable decisive action against the enemy’s forces.

FIGHT NO BATTLE UNPREPARED; DEVELOP STRATEGY BASED ON THE WORST CONDITIONS 

1-47. This principle is similar to the general planning process of many armed forces. Commanders ensure that troops are as prepared as possible for any battle, and they conduct planning based on the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, rather than its most probable. 

CONCENTRATE FORCES TO ACHIEVE AN OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS, THEN DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN DETAIL 

1-48. This is another principle similar to Western military theories, though it specifies the importance of numerical advantage. This principle is most often seen in PLAA tactics: tactical-level units seek to use a combination of maneuver and deception to achieve their desired numerical superiority and allow engagement and defeat of the enemy in detail. Traditionally, the PLA sought to fight using close combat techniques, taking advantage of night operations to enable infiltration whenever possible. Technological advances changed this approach, incorporating longer-range weapons and nonlethal effects to strike the enemy at greater distances, decreasing the effect of the technological gaps the PLA faces with regard to night vision and electro-optical capabilities. 

CHOOSE THE FIRST BATTLE CAREFULLY 

1-49. This principle acknowledges the importance of gaining and maintaining the initiative; in this case, through a victorious first engagement. This principle extends beyond simple military battles; it also includes choosing the first decisive political or economic engagement carefully in order to set conditions for victory in a future decisive engagement. Along with “fight no battle unprepared,” this principle suggests an element of caution and prudence in determining when and if to go to war. 

UNIFY THE COMMAND AND COORDINATE 

1-50. As a basic and timeless military principle, PLA organization and doctrine regarding unified command differs somewhat from Western militaries. While the latter imbue command authority with a single individual—the commander—the PLA considers unity of command to be as much a political issue as an operational principle. Units feature both military and political leadership, and creating political unity of purpose is considered a critical component of People’s War. 

COMBINE MOBILE WAR, POSITIONAL WAR, AND GUERRILLA WAR 

1-51. This principle outlines the three types of warfare proposed by Mao, and it resembles the more modern theory of hybrid warfare. Mobile units use a combination of maneuver and deception to achieve surprise in decisive actions; static, defensive units fix opponents and defend or secure key areas from attack and guerrilla forces conduct irregular campaigns either behind enemy lines or within enemy formations. All forms are carefully coordinated to ensure unity of purpose and situational understanding. 

EMPLOY FORCES AND TACTICS FLEXIBLY 

1-52. Similar to U.S. Army principles and doctrine, this principle acknowledges the importance of flexibility in any military situation. Historically, the PLA was notoriously inflexible, with subordinates often failing to employ their own judgment due to fear of reprisal or lack of professional competence. The PLA’s new focus on building a professional noncommissioned officer corps and a decentralized leadership philosophy reflect its understanding of shortfalls in this area. Many PLA exercises currently stress tactical innovation on the part of commanders at all levels. 

FIGHT IN ONE’S OWN WAY, AND LET THE ENEMY FIGHT IN ITS 

1-53. Perhaps the most famous of Mao’s principles, this principle reinforces China’s views about the uniqueness of its approach to military operations. It stresses the importance of knowing both one’s own capabilities and those of the opponent.